







identity of  individuals. Common to many of  them is  the fact   that a 
significant   amount  of   information   is   collected   and   transmitted;   this 
information is then used to compare the captured biometric data with 
the previously recorded information identifying a particular individual. 
If   the   two pieces  of   information  are  similar,   it   is  assumed  that   the 
identification is carried out correctly. 
An   important   problem   in   this   process   is   the   safeguarding   of   the 
transmission of the captured information. In many cases, it cannot be 
assumed that the channel over which this information is transmitted is 
secure.  Therefore it   is crucial  that   the process be viable even if   the 
channel is insecure. We outline an approach that ensures the security 
and   integrity  of   this  process.  We demonstrate   that   this  approach   is 
highly   effective   in   that   it   requires   only  minimal   additional   storage 
capacity   and   virtually   no   additional   processing   capacity   to   be 
functional.
Support   of   this   research   under   NSF   grants   DUE   0313880,   SCI 
0453498, and OISE 0519316 is acknowledged.
1. Introduction
The   authentication   of   users   in   shared   systems   is   an   important   problem;   it   has 
numerous solutions [2, 3, 5, 10]. Historically, computer systems have used passwords 
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impetus   for   the   study   of   alternative  means   for   authenticating   users.   The  most 
important of these are biometric measurements [8, 11]. 






The   biometric   measurements   are   intimately   tied   to   a   specific 
individual.










contrasted  with   the   equality   test.  While   passwords   are   very   definite,   biometric 











perpetrators  of  crimes.  Fingerprints  are  generally  assumed  to  be  entirely  unique. 
However,  not  all   individuals have suitable fingerprints,  either because of  missing 













Hand   geometry   [4]   uses   geometric   aspects   of   the   hand   and   specific   physical 
characteristics of hand and fingers. The data captured are either several 2D images or 










intrusive;   it   is   in   fact   the   only   biometric   authentication   approach   that   can   be 
administered  without   knowledge   and   cooperation   of   the   subject   and   also   at   a 
distance. A large amount of data is captured in this process. The similarity test is 
correspondingly complex.
DNA  [1]   is   of   course   the  ultimate   identifier   (except   that   it   cannot  differentiate 
between   identical   twins).  While   it   has  major   drawbacks  within   the   context   of 













factors such as medical conditions (cold,  asthma, etc.)  and fatigue,   the similarity 
condition is especially crucial. Again, both the stored template (voice sample) and 
the captured voice record imply significant data requirements.
Finally,   the   (mechanical)  way   a   user   types   text   at   a   keyboard   can   be   used   to 
authenticate that user. While the discriminative power of keystroke dynamics [7] is 
limited (it is unlikely that millions of typists can be reliably differentiated from each 
other  by   this   approach)   and   the   failure   rate   is   larger   than  with   other  biometric 
methods,   it   shares with  them the fact   that  a  substantial  amount of  data must  be 
captured and transmitted in order to apply this approach.
A major disadvantage of all biometric approaches over password schemes is that it is 
(virtually)  impossible  to change biometric  aspects of  a  person.  In  particular,   this 












and   integrity   constraints.  This   assumption   is   generally   realistic  because   the   two 






The   problem   of   intercepts   can   be   stated   as   follows:   Assume   that   biometric 
measurements of an individual requesting access are captured at  an access point; 
these data are then transmitted to a central facility where it is determined whether a 
match   between   the   captured  measurements   and   the   stored   template   exists.   This 
involves  carrying out   the   similarity   test.   If   a  match does  exist,   the   individual   is 
granted  access;  otherwise  additional  attempts  may be  permitted  before  access   is 
definitively denied. The problem we address here is the following: How can we avoid 
that a third party intercepts the captured measurements for the purpose of reusing 
them  at   some   other   time   and   in   an   illicit  way?  While   the   inclusion   of   timing 
information  may   impede   this   replay   attack,   this   is   fraught  with   difficulties;   in 
particular, this assumes that the measurement capturing access point is impervious to 
any attacks,  in particular  to schemes that cause it  to change its  local  time. Since 
synchronization   in   this   approach   is   crucial,   the   ability  of   the   central   processing 
facility   to   synchronize   the   times   of   the   local   measurement   stations   may   be 
compromised   and   result   in   resetting   the   time,  which   in   turn  would   defeat   the 







we  assume  that  no   reliable   timing   information   is   available.  We  require   that   the 







We now exploit   the   fact   that  biometric  measurements,   in   contrast   to  passwords, 
contain a great deal of redundancy: changing portions of a password most likely will 









It   follows   that   because   of   the   redundancy   involved,   because   of   the   way 
measurements   are   taken,   and   because   of   the   variability   of   human   physical 




how   to   ensure   that   attackers   cannot   produce   artificially   small   variations   in   the 
measurements. The second question is easily addressed: Since the measurements are 
encrypted before transmission, the attacker has no access to the plaintext, but only to 
the ciphertext.  Since a change in the ciphertext  dramatically affects  the resulting 





consists  of   two parts,   the   test  whether   the  measurement   that  was   transmitted   is 
identical   to   any   previously   transmitted  measurement,   and   the   similarity   test   as 
before. While the similarity test is most likely carried out on the basis of plaintext 
data  (that   is   the transmitted encrypted data must be first  decrypted),   the  test   for 





















fewer   than   ten  billion  humans   alive.  Yet,   even   if   there   are   a  million   successful 
accesses in a year, the system requires additional storage capacity of no more than 














legitimate measurement,  and not a  replay attack. Therefore,   the likelihood of   the 
second request being rejected again is greatly reduced, if it is legitimate! How many 
such   repeat   attempts   are   permitted   is   a   policy   issue.   Important   for   us   is   that 
observation that repeated legitimate measurements necessarily result in different data 
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